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ABSTRACT
In the past decade, the information security and threat landscape
has grown significantly making it difficult for a single defender to
defend against all attacks at the same time. This called for introduc-
ing information sharing, a paradigm in which threat indicators are
shared in a community of trust to facilitate defenses. Standards for
representation, exchange, and consumption of indicators are pro-
posed in the literature, although various issues are undermined. In
this paper, we rethink information sharing for actionable intelli-
gence, by highlighting various issues that deserve further explo-
ration. We argue that information sharing can benefit from well-
defined use models, threat models, well-understood risk by mea-
surement and robust scoring, well-understood and preserved pri-
vacy and quality of indicators and robust mechanism to avoid free
riding behavior of selfish agent. We call for using the differential
nature of data and community structures for optimizing sharing.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of new information and communication tech-
nology platforms, such as cloud computing, mobile computing, so-
cial networks, and the Internet of Things (IoT), the security land-
scape has become more sophisticated in the past decade. What used
to be an unmotivated form of vandalism during the early days of
the Internet has become a diverse ecosystem of cybercrime, where
providers and consumers come together to achieve various end-
goals and utilities. The persistence, complexity, size, and capabili-
ties of today’s adversaries are unbounded, and their threat does not
only affect individuals or organizations, but also nations as a whole:
according to a recent study [32], direct and indirect costs due to se-
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curity breaches have costed the global economy about $491 billion
in 2014 alone.
The need for information sharing. Defending against the un-
known is a difficult task [6]. Accordingly, visibility into the be-
havior and capabilities of adversaries to form detection signatures
is an essential first step towards containing and defending against
them, and ultimately thwarting their harms [14]. On the other hand,
with the unprecedented complexity and size of the threat ecosys-
tem, no single defender can defend against all attacks all the time.
Even when facing attacks, defenders need to have the right skills
to recognize them before performing defense efforts. With the skill
gap on the rise, visibility into attacks and malicious actors becomes
a challenge. Thus, a coordinated solution based upon the collec-
tive knowledge of multiple defenders is required. In such a solu-
tion, multiple stakeholders share information about security inci-
dents observed and collected from their security operations, with
the hope that such information would be useful to other stakehold-
ers in improving their security posture.
Information Sharing. Recently, information sharing as a concept
has emerged as a plausible solution to addressing the aforemen-
tioned problems. Threat information sharing is utilized for effi-
ciently and effectively defending against emerging threats. One
even went as far as to say that “threat intelligence sharing is the
only way to combat the growing skills gap” [23]. In practice, in-
formation sharing is used to communicate operational security ex-
perience between a set of participants in a sharing system with the
hope that sharing would 1) enable participants to defend their sys-
tems against ongoing attacks, and 2) improve their defense posture
by proactively addressing possible attacks even before they target
them.
Initiatives of information sharing. Information sharing is not a
theoretical idea, and there has been a lot of work in the past on
defining tools for representing information, or mechanisms for ex-
changing such information between information sharing partici-
pants in sharing communities. Information sharing also has been
embraced by various communities, and leaders in such commu-
nity have created their own sharing exchange points, where partic-
ipants could deliver and retrieve the shared raw data and annotated
data (intelligence) from other participants using standard applica-
tion program interfaces (APIs): for example, Facebook has cre-
ated ThreatExchange [9], and Verisign has created the IntelGraph,
among others. Such initiatives are not limited to the private sec-
tor: the public sector initiated information sharing in the US De-
partment of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Critical Infrastructure Cy-
ber Information Sharing and Collaboration (CISCP) program [1],
which aims to facilitate sharing of threat indicators between the
private and public sectors and vice versa.
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Risks of sharing. The risk of not sharing information is clear,
which can be seen in more and more security breaches using the
same attack vectors and capabilities, and re-examining the same
vulnerabilities. Despite the various benefits of information shar-
ing for security, even within a limited community of participants,
shared information without proper restrictions, however, may leak
a significant amount of information about the participants and their
operation context. For example, information shared for the good
and security of the participating community can be also used by
the adversary to learn about vulnerabilities of those participants.
Also, the same vulnerabilities can be used to test their applicability
on other systems: with the lag in patching vulnerabilities, the ad-
versary will be able to utilize such information for attacking other
unpatched systems.
This risk of sharing can be mitigated in information sharing by
limiting the sharing community to highly trusted participants, and
informing potentially subjected participants with the risk ahead of
time, and certainly before sharing such information with a broader
community. However, limiting sharing to a highly trusted commu-
nity of participants in general security applications, while reduc-
ing risk of information exposure to unintended parties—including
adversaries—may have an equally damaging consequence: the se-
curity of today’s systems with the presence of multiple stakehold-
ers exhibit the end-to-end principle of design characterized by fate-
sharing. For example, an unpatched system under the control of un-
informed player simply because that player is not trusted (enough)
can be used to attack other systems under the control of the highly
trusted participants. Classification of participants’ risk in sharing
communities is provided in the literature, despite the lack clarity
on how such risk should be assessed [2]1.
Another scenario of sharing where negative consequences may
arise is privacy of individuals, and how sharing may affect civil
liberties [16]. The sharing of public data that does not in of and
itself identify individuals would serve the goal of information shar-
ing without any side effects on privacy. However, it is believed
that privacy does not often go along well with security: to be able
to attribute attacks and perform various security analyses, context
information should be present along with the threat indicators for
further inferences that would serve security. For example, along
with an end point (i.e., hostname, or IP address) an incident indi-
cator typically shared would include e-mail addresses, URLs, etc.,
from which intelligence is gathered, and security risk is assessed.
Privacy risks due to sharing are arguably mitigated by a mini-
malistic approach, where only a limited amount of data is collected
and shared [2]. However, whether such a minimalistic approach
is being implemented in today’s sharing paradigms or not is un-
clear. Furthermore, such an approach goes against security utilities.
We conjecture (with confidence based on various plausible applica-
tions) that the additional context information of the threat informa-
tion shared is often times as important as the indicators themselves.
To this end, a new approach to thinking privacy is required beyond
simple minimization. Such a technique could perhaps utilize tech-
niques for safeguarding all necessary information to improve the
security posture of a defender, while ensuring the privacy of users,
and confidentiality of shared information.
Related to the community of trust problem above and perceived
risk of over sharing (whether it is for security or privacy) is the
problem of “free-riding”. As a result of the perceived risk of shar-
1Indeed, the work in [2] while being seminal in implementing var-
ious ideas to realize an information sharing system, it does not ad-
dress how such risk should be assessed, and how audit (for both
security and privacy) should be performed. It rather leaves to users
to decide which levels of risk they should assign to themselves
ing, some actors might be actually joining communities of sharing,
although not sharing sufficient information to the community that
others can benefit from it [18, 19]. When a community member
joins and shares information there is always the risk of the shared
information (e.g., about a vulnerability) being leaked to the public
(or even worse, to the adversary), resulting in both monetary and
reputation loses. Such scenario leads to that some actors might not
truthfully share information due to their own self-interests. While
recent works have been focused on addressing problem in a theoret-
ical framework [38, 37], assuming the level of participation as an
indicator of contribution in information sharing, there is no work
that extends beyond that to account for quality of indicators. For
example, an actor that contributes stale indicators, indicators that
are not timely to be utilized operationally, while not considered a
free-rider in the typical sense, is not contributing sufficiently and
meaningfully to the missing of information sharing.
Believing in their beneficial aspects, the goal of this study is
to shed light on various issues associated with information shar-
ing, including understanding community structures, use and adver-
sary models, privacy issues and quality of indicators for detecting
free riding in information sharing for actionable threat intelligence.
With standard sharing formats being widely advocated as the next
step towards effective sharing, we identify the need for understand-
ing privacy and risk. To understand this risk in context, we iden-
tify a plausible sharing scenario for which we define the adversary
models associated with both internal or external adversaries. We in-
troduce to the analysis the various sharing paradigms under them.
By identifying the need for security, we advocate an approach that
combines various aspects of design techniques that exploit the dif-
ferential nature of data and community structure. Finally, we iden-
tify quality of indicators as an important direction, suggest various
directions to assessing quality, and call the research community to
further the suggested directions.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we provide our broad vision of various directions for re-
thinking sharing towards actionable threat intelligence. In section 3
we ellaborate on one of directions, namely privacy. In section 4 we
elaborate on another issue, namely, quality of indicators. Conclud-
ing remarks are in section 5.
2. RETHINKING SHARING
Realizing actionable intelligence by striking a balance between
utility of the information sharing systems and other requirements,
including privacy, security, and complexity of the sharing system,
is a non-trivial task. In the following, we offer to rethink sharing
by touching on various fundamental issues and building blocks in
typical sharing systems. We identify the following issues as rich ar-
eas that require further research and exploration, and offer various
directions associated with each of those issues in the subsequent
sections. We offer to understand use models (§2.1), sharing com-
munities (§2.2), adversaries in sharing paradigms, including both
outsider and insider adversaries (§2.3), quantifying understanding
privacy in information sharing, towards measurement
2.1 Defining the Use Model
Information sharing is inseparable from its use model and sce-
nario. Thus, understanding the various technical details of the use
model of information sharing tools and paradigms is essential to
understanding various issues, including security, privacy, and func-
tional issues. We offer to touch on various scenarios of use and
issues associated with in the following.
We classify the use models of information sharing for threat in-
telligence into various types based on various classification criteria,
as follows:
• Structure: Based on the structure and format of the shared
information, we classify information sharing tools into struc-
tured (standard) and unstructured sharing models.
• Centralization: Based on whether a centralized sharing en-
tity (repository) exists or not, we classify such models into
centralized and decentralized systems.
• Scope and function: Information sharing tools can be also
classified based on their scope and function. While it is dif-
ficult to enumerate such scopes and functions for unstructure
sharing systems, structured systems that use standards are
classified into enumeration, scoring, languages, and trans-
port mechanisms. More details are provided in §3.
Unstructured Sharing. The end goal of information sharing is to
realize a secure cyberspace by exchanging operational security ex-
perience across multiple players in a sharing community. Whether
data used in the information sharing paradigm is structured or not
is irrelevant to the main goal of information sharing. Tradition-
ally, threat information concerning incidents has been collected and
shared as unstructured data, and exchanged via generic communi-
cation tools and services, including electronic mail, or file transfer
services. Today, and despite the rise of structure via standardized
formats and sharing schemas, proprietary formats are widely used
in by vendors in security market, making interoperation between
structures hard to achieve. While it is easier to understand struc-
tured schemas, where various attributes are indicated, understand-
ing the privacy of sharing when using unstructured formats is not
possible. To this end, in the rest of this work we focus on structured
sharing format, although we believe that unstructured sharing also
may have various privacy risks that should be studied and addressed
based on actual assessments.
Sharing Using Standard Formats. For efficient use of shared in-
formation in an automated manner, it is desirable to share infor-
mation in a standard and structured format. For that, there has
been a lot of work in the literature on understanding use scenar-
ios, and developing the relevant schemas of structured formats for
information sharing. By understanding the type of data in such
information sharing formats, it would not only be possible to un-
derstand the capabilities embodied in the various sharing formats,
but also to understand the privacy risks in the abstract, and possibly
develop technical solutions to address it. Examples of such sharing
paradigms include CVE, CCE, CWE, etc. CyBox, etc. More on
those schemas and formats are in §3.1.
2.2 Defining Communities
Sharing is defined around “communities of trust”, which are the
structure in which (potentially) threat information is shared to reach
a common goal of strengthening the security posture of various par-
ticipants in the community. Sharing today is defined based on the
nature of the participants (whether they are public or private sector
participants) into private-private, public-private, and public-public.
An example of the private-private sector information sharing com-
munities include participants in the likes of ThreatExchange, or
IntelGraph, while an example of the public-private partnernships
include DHS’s CISCP [1].
On the one hand, various of those communities are vetted care-
fully to ensure that the information being shared between the vari-
ous participants in the sharing system is safeguarded and not used
to attack any participant in the system. On the other hand, circum-
stantial evidence (or even conclusive evidence [33]) has shown that
information being shared in the sharing system could potentially be
used as an attack vector against another participant in the system.
Understanding the make up of the sharing community is perhaps a
first step to account for such risk.
Redefining communities. Redefining communities structure by
relaxing the meaning and assumptions of “trust” in a way that would
allow for a greater participation of players in a sharing system re-
sults, thus potentially resulting for improved defenses and security
awareness by a larger number of participants, would potentially
result in a higher risk of sharing. Such risk is not only seen in
increasing the security attack surface, but potentially in disincen-
tivizing major community members from meaningful and sharing
of quality information that could result in actionable intelligence.
Understanding how relaxing the definition of the community would
affect both utility of the sharing system and the risk of sharing is to
be considered further in light of actual and measurable risk.
Privacy-based community definition. So far, communities have
been defined for their trustworthiness with respect to their risk aware-
ness, or for utilizing the various tools and paradigms of information
sharing, but not understood with respect to privacy. Thus, we be-
lieve it is a worthwhile to incorporate privacy as a metric (along
with other metrics of risk or in isolation) as a criteria for defining
communities. Furthermore, technical solutions that take into ac-
count a clear definition of privacy-awareness and its presence (or
lack) in a certain community (or players in a community) could
be further optimized to suite the underlying assumptions of such
community.
2.3 Redefining Adversaries
Security and privacy of communication and computation proto-
cols are often analyzed under various settings of adversaries. Ad-
versaries are characterized by capabilities under which security and
privacy definitions are formalized, and security and privacy guaran-
tees (in light of a formally defined advantage of the adversary) are
outlined. With the complexity and involved nature of information
sharing paradigms, and the end-goal that they try to achieve, we ar-
gue that both insider and outsider (external) adversaries are relevant
to studying the information sharing in the field. In the following,
we elaborate on both forms of threat, and open directions to address
in order to realize a formally-backed exchange.
External adversary. Outsider adversaries in the context of infor-
mation sharing are defined broadly as adversaries who are not part
of the system or protocol being analyzed, and they include various
forms of actors, ranging simply from a passive eavesdropper [5, 12]
or honest-but-curious [21] to the more advanced active adversary–
an adversary that could potentially interfere with communication
or manipulate computations in order to affect the security of the
system, or breach the privacy of a participant. This adversary can
be a single malicious actor, or multiple of them. The main qualifier
of this adversary, however, is that it is not included in the set of
participants of the system.
Examples of instances of such adversary include simple observers
on the communication channel between participants in the infor-
mation sharing system, with their risks being mitigated by the vari-
ous in-place cryptographic techniques. Another example of the ob-
server could be a publicly shared infrastructure, like cloud, where
the cloud provider may have a great incentive not to act maliciously,
but would be interested in knowing some details about the informa-
tion being shared and hosted in the cloud. While auditing and strict
policies are one direction to tame this adversary, relinquishing trust
and enforcing a stronger form of audit—perhaps by utilizing cryp-
tographic approaches, is yet another method. We elaborate on such
methods in the subsequent sections.
The same example above of cloud could be also viewed as a
totally untrusted, and potentially malicious, thus being an instance
of the malicious adversary. Such state of being malicious could be
a property of the cloud itself; i.e., the cloud provider is untrusted, or
due to other externalities, e.g., the cloud is being compromised by
an outsider through, for example, a malware campaign. The way
that such adversary is realized is irrelevant to understanding the
privacy of the various sharing paradigms, although the capabilities
of such adversary are.
Insider adversary. Motivated by the various risks that potentially
could be the result of misuse of the information shared an informa-
tion sharing system [33], another adversary model that needs to be
formalized is the insider adversary. Whereas typical threats in var-
ious systems include the external adversary highlighted above, the
nature of information sharing systems highlight that insider adver-
saries are real risks. Such adversaries could be in multiple forms,
and stem out of various system and operation realities. For exam-
ple, such adversary could be another participant in the information
sharing system acting maliciously to reach a certain objective, or
an individual acting on behalf of a participant in the system.
Understanding how information sharing is prone to such class
of adversaries is necessary to enable sharing. Furthermore, such
adversary could perhaps be studied well under other notions of risk
associated with information sharing and definition of communities
of trust, their risk and privacy awareness.
2.4 Measurements
One may argue that the problem at hand is not any different from
any other privacy problem due to data exposure, thus thinking of
the privacy issues in information sharing for threat intelligence in
the abstract is meaningful and the way this problem should be ad-
dressed given the large number of use scenarios.
We argue that while thinking of this problem in the abstract is
worthwhile, also approaching the problem with technical solutions
that stem from the actual size and shape of privacy exposure in the
various information sharing paradigms is equally important. A first
step towards understanding the actual size and shape of exposure
is facilitated by an actual quantification of exposure in real data.
However, one cannot quantify what he cannot measure, thus mea-
suring data exposure in the various sharing paradigms, under the
various settings of threat models or in isolation, is necessary and
important for understanding the problem in practice. In particular,
measurements would give analytical and abstract studies context
that highlight the actual meaning of findings related to indicators,
privacy, and risk.
Measuring privacy leakage in the various paradigms of sharing
and under various use models is not an easy task. We argue that
privacy cannot be understood in the abstract, and without a clear
context of the sharing [30]. Even worse, what constitute a privacy
concern to one individual might not be of value to another individ-
ual in the same context. Thus, a first step to measuring privacy leak-
age in information sharing is to formalize what we mean by privacy,
what are the private attributes that should be treated with care and
hidden from adversaries and other (potentially honest-but-curious)
participants, and how sensitive (with respect to their privacy value)
alone or when associated with other data about the subject.
2.5 Quality and Privacy
Quality of the indicators and privacy are at odds: in order to
provide the highest accuracy in security operations, access to raw
and highlight annotated indicators that can be of use for actionable
intelligence is necessary. On the other hand, having such raw indi-
cators without any sanitization or masking of any of their contents
could potentially leak the privacy of entities associated, or reveal
sensitive information about the operation context where they are
collected, directly or indirectly. To this end, another direction to
pursue is by answering the following question: How much qual-
ity of indicators should be given up to satisfy various privacy
notions and guarantees.
This question is not easy to answer: there are various competing
and varying notions of privacy, and systematically and formally an-
alyzing and modeling how they are met (or violated) at various lev-
els of exposure of indicators. Before even approaching this ques-
tion, it would be necessary to formalize metrics for evaluating the
quality of the indicators.
3. UNDERSTANDING RISK IN SHARING
There is a clear risk of sharing, whether it is privacy or security.
Understanding such risk is the first step towards providing practical
solutions to the various aspects of risk. In the following, we elab-
orate on a road-map for understanding risk in information sharing,
mainly emphasizing privacy risks. In §3.1 we review the various
sharing schemes. In §3.2 we highlight risks of information shar-
ing through various measurements and examples from anonymized
sharing datasets. In §3.3 we argue for a privacy leakage assessment
design that takes into account the various issues raised on the risk
of the sharing paradigms. In §3.4 we advocate architectural design
that takes into account privacy and community structure as a design
principle.
3.1 An Overview of Sharing Standards
As noted previously, there are various standards for information
sharing that are used by government and industry to automate and
structure the exchange of information within an organization and
between autonomous systems and organizations. We can classify
these sharing standards into four main categories:
Enumerations. Standardized enumerations of platforms, configu-
rations, software weaknesses, and attacks. Examples include Com-
mon Configuration Enumeration (CCE), Common Weakness Enu-
meration (CWE), and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE).
A listing of such enumeration techniques is shown in Table 1.
Scoring systems. Standards to assess the severity of computer
system-related issues and assigning scores to each one, allowing re-
sponders to prioritize remediation tasks. Common standards that fit
this category include Common Vulnerability Scoring System(CVSS)
and Common Weakness Scoring System(CWSS). A listing of such
scoring systems is shown in Table 2.
Languages. Those sharing standards are intended for encoding
high-fidelity information about systems in a manner that facilitates
parsing this information in software tools and converting them to
human-readable formats. This includes formats like Incident Ob-
ject Description Exchange Format (IODEF) and Open Vulnerabil-
ity and Assessment Language (OVAL). A listing of such standards
is shown in Table 3.
Transport. Those standards represent Inter-network communica-
tion formats to facilitate exchange of information between hosts.
Standards such as Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) and Trusted
Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) fit this cat-
egory. In the following, we elaborate on the different category of
standards and how they are used to automate information sharing
within organizations. A listing of such standards is shown in Ta-
ble 4.
3.2 A Privacy Risk in Standards
In this section, we highlight the various risks associated with in-
formation sharing. For that, anonymized examples depicted from
sharing operations utilizing the standard schemas for information
Table 1: Enumeration Standards
Name Description
Common Vulnerability Exposure Standard identifiers for publicly-disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Common Weakness Enumeration Standard identifiers for software weaknesses or flaws.
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification Enumeration of cyber-attack techniques.
Common Configuration Enumeration Enumeration of configurations covering various platforms and controls ref.
Common Platform Enumeration Standard identifiers for platforms, operating systems and applications.
Table 2: Scoring System Standards
Name Description
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Standard rating for calculating a score on severity of vulnerabilities.
Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) Risk rating of software vulnerabilities considering access complexity.
sharing. For illustration, we label the leaking fields with different
colors depending on class of data being exposed, specifically, we
designate red color for PII fields, light blue for non-PII sensitive
fields (e.g., related to business context), and yellow for inference-
leaking fields.
Legend:
Inference Sensitive PII
In the following, we highlight such risk through various examples
obtained from real shared information.
1 <IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">189493 </
IncidentID >
2 <ReportTime >2001-09-13T23:19:24+00:00</ReportTime >
3 <Assessment><Completion="failed" type="admin"
/></Assessment>
4 <ContactName >Example.com CSIRT</ContactName >
5 <Email>contact@csirt.example.com</Email >
6 <Address >192.0.2.200</Address >
7 <Address >192.0.2.16/28</Address >
8 <Service \hlcyan{ip_protocol="6"}>
9 <Port>80</Port>
10 <Expectation action="block-host" />
11 <DateTime >2001-09-13T18:11:21+02:00</DateTime >
12 <Item>GET /default.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX’</Item >
13 <DateTime >2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00</DateTime >
14 <Description >sent to constituency-con-
tact@192.0.2.200</Description>
Figure 1: Annotated private, sensitive, and confidential
information (inference) information in IODEF.
1 <IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">59334</
IncidentID >
2 <ReportTime >2006-08-02T05:54:02-05:00</ReportTime >
3 <Assessment><Impact type="recon" completion="succeeded"
/></Assessment>
4 <ContactName >CSIRT for example.com</ContactName >
5 <Email>contact@csirt.example.com</Email >
6 <Telephone >+1 412 555 12345</Telephone >
7 <Contact role="tech" type="person" restriction="need-to-
know">
8 <ContactName >Joe Smith</ContactName >
9 <Email>smith@csirt.example.com</Email >
10 <!-- Scanning activity as follows: 192.0.2.1:60524 >
192.0.2.3:137 192.0.2.1:60526 >192.0.2.3:138
192.0.2.1:60527 >192.0.2.3:139 192.0.2.1:60531 >
192.0.2.3:445 -->
11 <!-- Scanning activity as follows: 192.0.2.2 >
192.0.2.3/28:445 -->
Figure 2: Annotated private, sensitive, and confidential
information (inference) information in IODEF
Figure 1: Annotated private, sensitive, and confidential infor-
mation (inference) information in IODEF.
IODEF worm report. An example of a CSIRT reporting an in-
stance of the Code Red worm, encoded in IODEF, is depicted in
Figure 1 (notice that a substantial part of the document is omitted,
and only essential information is shown for demonstration). As
shown, the document contains contact information (name, registry
handle, email) for the constituent responsible for the incident re-
port. This type of information may become personally identifiable
in the case when contact information of a particular individual is
used. The document also includes other fields that are less sensi-
tive. This includes reporting time, record datetime, IP addresses of
the node or network that were targeted in the attack, as well as the
targeted service port number.
In this example, th Code Red worm attempted to target the
HTTP port for a host machine with an IP address of 192.0.2.200.
The raw HTTP request sent by the worm is also captured in the re-
porting. The worm intended to fiddle with the web server and the
request was presumably an attempt for a buffer overflow attack in
order to escalate to administrative privileges. Consequently, if the
worm was successful in gaining access to the machine the infor-
mation captured from the raw HTTP request may become highly
sensitive. However, we know from the “assessment” field in the
document that it was a failed attempt. Another example, with some
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11 <DateT me >2001-09-13T18:11:21+02:00</DateTime >
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13 <DateTime >2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00</DateTime >
14 <Description >sent to constituency-con-
tact@192.0.2.200</Description>
Figure 1: Annotated private, sensitive, and confidential
information (inference) information in IODEF.
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Figure 2: Annotated private, sensitive, and confidential
information (inference) information in IODEFFigure 2: Annotated private, sensitive, and confidential infor-
mation (inference) information in IODEF
information masked, based on the same standard is shown in Fig-
ure 2.
MAEC package dynamic triage. An example to demonstrates
how a package using the MAEC standard can be used to capture
multiple dynamic analysis tool outputs for a malware instance is
shown in Figure 3—shortened for summary only. It builds upon
static triage example that shows the actions and details of the pro-
cess tree associated with the instance. As depicted, the packaged
output has few fields that may be considered sensitive, such as the
domain name of the command & control server (reallybadguy.com;
only for illustration). Exposing the domain name server to entities
outside of the trusted community may inform the attacker about
the detection of their malware instance, and thus link the malware
reported by the subject with a campaign.
In addition to exposing the domain name field, the output also
includes a field about bundle actions that are associated with the
malware and the status of these actions. In this example, the mal-
ware successfully created a file on the host filesystem but failed to
resolve the DNS for the command control server.
MAEC package configuration parameter. Another example us-
ing MAEC, which demonstrates how to specify configuration pa-
rameters related to a malware instance characterized by a malware
Table 3: Language Standards
Name Description
Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC) Language to describe malware characteristics, behavior, and actions.
Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) Language to express machine state, writing assessment tests and reporting results.
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) Format to define computer and network security-related incidents.
Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) Language for writing security checklists, benchmarks and other related documents.
Structured Threat Information Exchange (STIX) Format to express information about cyber-security threats.
Table 4: Transport Standards
Name Description
Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Transport standard that facilitates sharing of incident-handling data, typically stored in
IODEF-formatted documents.
Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) Standard that defines protocols and messages to exchange cyber-threat information.
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) Messaging framework typically used in implementation of web services.
Reputation Services (Repute, DKIM) Standards that define query methods for reputation data services.
subject, is shown in Figure 4. The configuration parameters are
captured for tools such as remote access tools or reverse shell util-
ities and may include mutual exclusions, passwords, or IDs, for
example. As shown below, a password value is specified as a con-
figuration parameter. This may not be highly critical for malware
samples that are password-protected, but it can be if the credentials
provided in these fields are for accessing real sensitive documents
or remote services.
1 <FileObj:File_Name >dg003_improve_8080_V132.exe</
2 <cyboxCommon:Type ...>MD5</cyboxCommon:Type>
3 4EC0027BEF4D7E1786A04D021FA8A67F
4 <maecBundle:Action id=maec-example-act-19 context=Host
action_status=Success>
5 create file</cybox:Name>
6 <maecBundle:Action id=maec-example-act-15 context=Network
action_status=Fail>
7 <cybox:Name xsi:type="maecVocabs:
DNSActionNameVocab -1.0">send dns
query</cybox:Name>
8 <URIObj:Value >4.test.3322.org.cn</URIObj:Value>
Figure 3: MAEC for dynamic triage
IDs, for example. As shown below, a password value is
specified as a configuration parameter. This may not be
highly critical for malware samples that are password-
protected, but it can be if the credentials provided in
these fields are for accessing real sensitive documents or
remote services.
1 <FileObj:File_Name >Investor Relations
Contacts.doc\hlcyan{MD5}
<cyboxCommon:Simple_Hash_Value>\hlcyan
{875767086897 e90fb47a021b45e161b2}\
hl{password}\hl{wwwst@Admin}
Figure 4: An example of information leakage using
MAEC for information sharing for configuration param-
eters
Other countless examples that demonstrate various
levels of risk to information that falls under one or more
of the categories above exist. By showing those exam-
ples above, we hope to trigger interest in the commu-
nity of pursuing research on understanding the level of
leakage (and its context) for various of those sharing
schemes in various application contexts.
3.3 Privacy Leakage Assessment
With a clear understanding of what constitute at-
tributes that would result in privacy violation, the pres-
ence or absence of such attributes in one instance of
sharing could be used to assess privacy leakage in to-
tal. Informally speaking, we define a privacy leakage
metric, a single number associated with instances of
standards when fully utilized to quantitively analyze the
existing (potentially) private information in them. This
metric can then be used to obtain numbers for each field
in the schema of the standard, that could be aggregated
to reflect a single score on the privacy level of other
words.
An example scoring system that assigns real values to
various pieces of information in a sharing standard is as
follows (just an example).2
• Score 0: Public data or non-leaking
2The basic question we concern ourselves with is the
creation of such privacy-oriented scoring system rather
than realizing an exact numbering that would suite all
applications: various information sharing applications
weigh privacy di↵erently, and may adjust individual
scores di↵erently.
• Score 1: Inferential data
• Score 2: Sensitive data
• Score 4: PII data
The aggregate score is simply a summation of the
scores for each field in the data schema of the standard.
This is, let the schema of a standard have attributes
a1, a2, . . . an. Based on the scoring system above, we
generate scores s1, s2, . . . , sn, which correspond to the
various attributes. Using scoring system, we then calcu-
late a single score for the standard, namely s =
Pn
i=1 si.
Notice that the weights on the scoring metric can be
modified depending on the level of emphasis on each
class of data. In this example, one point is given for an
inferential field, two points for a sensitive field, and four
points for a PII field. Since PII is protected through reg-
ulations, we give more weight for a PII field to be twice
as significant as sensitive field and four times as signifi-
cant as inferential field. Interpreting the score is trivial;
the standard is considered highly privacy-leaking when
the score number is large and more privacy-friendly when
the number is small.
Table 5 shows privacy leaking fields in schemas of var-
ious information sharing standards using and following
a similar analysis to the one in the previous section.
As can be seen, out of the four classes of standards the
languages class have leaked the most personally identifi-
able information fields, particularly CyBox with a score
of 56, STIX with a score of 36 and XCCDF with a score
of 38. We notice that those standards embody various
standards, and are inclusive of a large schema (with a
large number of fields and attributes that cover mul-
tiple applications). Some standards have leaked fields
that are considered sensitive but not PII, such as times-
tamps, host attributes like IP addresses, and organiza-
tional information. Other standards, such as enumer-
ation standards, have mostly inference leaks related to
vulnerability indices and platform identification num-
bers, which could potentially utilized and misused by
an adversary.
Notice also that we do not advocate a specific scor-
ing system for the risk assessment, since such scoring is
context dependent. For example, an organization that
views confidential information, information to do with
business-related matters, might score confidential and
inferential information higher than PII, since PII is not
important to their security operation.
Figure 3: MAEC for dynamic triage
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The aggregate score is simply a summation of the
scores for each field in the data schema of the standard.
This is, let the schema of a standard have attributes
a1, a2, . . . an. Based on the scoring system above, we
generate scores s1, s2, . . . , sn, which correspond to the
various attributes. Using scoring system, we then calcu-
late a single score for the standard, namely s =
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Notice that the weights on the scoring metric can be
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class of data. In this example, one point is given for an
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an adversary.
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exist. By showing tho e examples above, we hope to trigg r interest
in the community of pursuing research on understanding the level
of leakage (and its context) for various of those sharing schemes in
various application contexts.
3.3 Privacy L akage As essment
With a clear understanding of what constitute attributes that would
result in privacy violation, the presence or absence of such attributes
in one instance of sharing could be used to assess privacy leakage
in total. Informally speaking, we define a privacy leakage met-
ric, a single number associated with instances of standards when
fully utilized to quantitively analyze the existing (potentially) pri-
vate information in them. This metric can then be used to obtain
numbers for each field in the schema of the standard, that could
be aggregated to reflect a single score on the privacy level of other
words.
An example scoring system that assigns real values to various
pieces of information in a sharing standard is as follows (just an
example).2
• Score 0: Public data or non-leaking
• Score 1: Inferential data
• Score 2: Sensitive data
• Score 4: PII data
The aggregate score is simply a summation of the scores for each
field in the data schema of the standard. This is, let the schema of a
standard have attributes a1, a2, . . . an. Based on the scoring system
above, we generate scores s1, s2, . . . , sn, which correspond to the
various attributes. Using scoring system, we then calculate a single
score for the standard, namely s =
∑n
i=1 si.
Notice that the weights on the scoring metric can be modified
depending on the level of emphasis on each class of data. In this
example, on point is given for an inferential field, two points for
a sensitive field, and four points for a PII field. Since PII is pro-
tected through regulations, we give more weight for a PII field to
be twice as significant as sensitive field and four times as significant
as inferential field. Interpreting the score is trivial; the standard is
considered highly privacy-leaking when the score number is large
and more privacy-friendly when the number is small.
Table 5 sho s privacy leaking fields in schemas of various in-
formation sharing standards using and followin a similar analysis
t the one in the previous section. As can be s en, out of the four
classes of standards the languages class have leaked the most per-
sonally identifiable information fields, pa ticularly CyBox with a
score of 56, STIX with a score of 36 and XCCDF with a score
of 38. We notice that those standards emb dy various standards,
and a inclusive of a large schema (with a large number of fields
2The b sic question we pose is the creati n of such privacy-
oriented scoring system rather than realizing an exact numbering
that would suite all applications: various information sharing appli-
cations weigh privacy differently, and may adjust individual scores
diff rently.
and attributes that cover multiple applications). Some standards
have leaked fields that are considered sensitive but not PII, such
as timestamps, host attributes like IP addresses, and organizational
information. Other standards, such as enumeration standards, have
mostly inference leaks related to vulnerability indices and platform
identification numbers, which could potentially utilized and mis-
used by an adversary.
Notice also that we do not advocate a specific scoring system
for the risk assessment, since such scoring is context dependent.
For example, an organization that views confidential information,
information to do with business-related matters, might score confi-
dential and inferential information higher than PII, since PII is not
important to their security operation.
3.4 Architectural Solutions for Privacy
A first step towards ensuring privacy is understanding the risk
highlighted earlier through the actual sharing paradigms. Using
a concrete notion of privacy, it would be then required to pro-
vide a technical solutions to meet such privacy notion, while en-
abling queries on the data shared using the various standards. In
the following, we advocate architectural design that takes privacy
and community structure into account for actionable intelligence
through sharing. We start by reviewing the various notions of pri-
vacy, and then highlight the design space that could be exploited to
ensure privacy.
3.4.1 Privacy Notions
Over the years, there has been various attempts in the literature
to define the notion of the privacy, and provide techniques to ensure
it. In the following, we review three notions that are of relevance,
and advancing them could potential aid addressing the problem of
privacy in the domain of information sharing: the k-anonymity, the
l-diversity, the differential privacy
k-anonymity. Sweeney [36] formulated the concept of k-anonymity
as an attempt to solve the problem of anonymizing person-specific
field-structured data with formal guarantees while still producing
useful data. A dataset is said to have the k-anonymity property
if the information for each person in the dataset cannot be dis-
tinguished from at least k-1 individuals. Two common methods
are available for achieving k-anonymity, namely supression, where
certain values of the dataset attributes are left blank, and general-
ization, where individual values of attributes are replaced by with a
broad category, typically a range of values. Meyerson and Williams
[25] demonstrated that optimal k-anonymity is an NP-hard prob-
lem, however heuristics given by [35] often yields effective re-
sults. K-anonymization is not a good method to anonymize high-
demensional dataset and have performed poorly for certain appli-
cations, such as mobile phone datasets [3].
l-diversity. As an extension to k-anonymity, Machanavajjhala et
al. proposed l-diversity [22], a model that handles some of the
weaknesses in the k-anonymity model by increasing group diver-
sity for sensitive attributes in the anonymization mechanism. The
l-diversity model addresses the problem in k-anonymity where sen-
sitive attributes within a group exhibit homogeneity. That is, when
all values for a sensitive attribute within records in a group are
identical, making it easily identifiable. Furthermore, the l-diversity
is claimed to be resistent against background knowledge attack,
whereby an adversary gains information through side-channel means
to reduce the set of all possible values for the sensitive attribute.
Differential Privacy. Dwork introduced the notion of ε-differential
privacy that provides a definition of privacy in statistical databases.
It provides rigorous guarantees against what an adversary can infer
from learning the results of some randomized algorithm. In other
words, an algorithm that statisfies differential privacy will not al-
ter the distribution of the output of querying a database regardless
whether a particular entry is present or absent from the database.
This notion has become an increasingly popular area of research
in terms of both theoretical analysis and practical instantiations.
Kairouz et al. [17] have proposed a composition theorem for dif-
ferential privacy that characterize the level of overall privacy degra-
dation as a function of the number of queries based on hypothesis
testing. McSherry and Talwar [24] have studied the application of
differential privacy to digital goods auction where participants are
incentivized to be honest. Xiao et al. [41] developed data pub-
lishing technique based on wavelet transforms that ensures differ-
ential privacy while maintaining accurate answers for range-count
queries.
3.4.2 Redesigning Sharing
As we highlighted so far, sharing is a complex function, which
should take into account various issues, including the structure of
the community of trust, the final objective of sharing, and (as advo-
cated in this work) privacy as an additional measure.
One way to deal with information shared through information
sharing schemas and paradigms as private, in its entirety, and pro-
vide technical solutions that can address them accordingly by en-
abling computations on private data. Such computations may in-
clude aggregates (private statistics [20, 31, 4]), set membership
(private set operations [21, 8]), among others. Techniques for per-
forming such computations may include homorphoic encryption [7,
13, 34, 10, 39] or secure multiple party computation[11]—among
other techniques and variants.
All of those techniques, when applied to the sheer volume of
shared information through the information sharing paradigm, and
including simple techniques like k-anonymity and l-diversity high-
lighted earlier, yield computationally inefficient solutions. To this
end, a practical solution that is aimed towards efficiency should
take into account the differential nature of information being con-
sumed through sharing paradigms, as well as the differential nature
of community structures in sharing systems.
One way to achieve efficiency is to consider privacy and risk
as highlighted in this paper as an optimization parameter for shar-
ing designs. Taking such parameter into account, it is potentially
possible to reduce the size of the data to be processed in a privacy-
preserving manner. For example, one could split a given schema of
information sharing tool into multiple schemas, based on the classi-
fication of the features and attributes of the given sharing standard.
As a result, expensive computations that require advanced cryp-
tographic techniques, or are geared towards achieving one of the
aforementioned privacy notions—e.g., adding noise for differential
privacy, or dummy items to ensure l-diversity and k-anonymity—
could be tolerated on a small subset of attributes of the information
being shared, whereas efficient computations could be performed
on the raw and plain information that does not have any privacy,
sensitive, or confidential markers.
Privacy is not the only optimization parameter that could be taken
into account, but also the structure of the community of trust. For
example, highly homogenous and trusted communities, e.g., a re-
sult of public-public partnership, could get away without imple-
menting the partitioned architecture for optimization, but rather us-
ing minimization (i.e., for what is being shared, and for how long)
on the raw data, thus achieving a higher accuracy, and better effi-
ciency.
Architectural innovation in information sharing is required to im-
prove practicality. Such innovation is facilitated by the differential
nature of data and sharing communities, and we argue that they
Table 5: Privacy leaking fields in schemas of various information sharing standards and example risk assessment using the indicated
scores for the various leaked attributes. Scores are for illustration only.
Standard Category Standard Privacy Leak
PII (4) Sensitive (2) Inference (1) Score
Enumeration CVE CVE-ID 1
CWE CWE-ID 1
CAPEC Submission:Source, Organization, Date Relationship:ViewID, TargetForm, Nature,
TargetID
10
CCE cce:modified_reference cce:cce_id, cce:platform 4
CPE cpe:title cpe:platform_id 3
Scoring Systems CVSS 0
CWSS 0
Languages OVAL contributor timestamp, submitted:date, status_change, af-
fected:family, platform, title, description
definition, reference 20
XCCDF Benchmark:metadata, test:identity cpe2:platform-specification, platform, status,
test:organization, test:profile, test:target, test:target-
address, test:target-facts, test:target-id-ref, test:start-time,
test:end-time, test:fact
affected:family, platform, benchmarkId-
Type, resolved, test:authenticated,
test:priviledged
38
MAEC CommentType:author ArtifactObj:Raw_Artifact, maecPack-
age:Configuration_Parameter, maecPack-
age:Name, maecPackage:Value, maecBun-
dle:Collections.timestamp, AnalysisType:start_datetime,
AnalysisType:complete_datetime, Anal-
ysisType:complete_datetime, Analy-
sisType:lastupdate_datetime, AnalysisType:Comments,
CommentType:timestamp
maecBundle:Action, maecBundle:CVE 26
CEE time, host, dst, ipv4, ipv6, src, port status 15
IODEF Contact, IncidentSource DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime Assessment, IncidentID, AlternativeID 19
STIX stixCommon:Identity, stixCiqIden-
tity:Specification, xnl:PersonName,
stixCommon:Name, xpil:Address,
xpil:ElectronicAddressIdentifier,
xpil:ContactNumber
timestamp, xpil:OrganizationInfo,
xnl:OrganisationName, xpil:Nationalities/xpil:Country/xal:NameElement
36
Cybox EmailMessageObj:Recipient, EmailMes-
sageObj:From, AddrObj:Address_Value,
EmailMessageObj:Raw_Header, Contribu-
tors, ContributorType: Role, Name, Email,
Phone
HTTPSessionObj:Value, URIObj:Value, Por-
tObj:Port_Value, ArtifactObj:Raw_Artifact,
EmailMessageObj:Date, X509CertificateObj:Subject,
X509CertificateObj:Issuer, TimeType: Start_Time,
End_Time, Produced_Time, Received_Time, Ob-
servation_Location, Observable_Location, Contribu-
torType:Organization, Date, Contribution_Location
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should be taken into to realize efficient sharing solutions. How-
ever, to take them into account, further research would be required
for understanding the hidden costs in implementing such architec-
ture, the actual trade-off provided by such split architecture, and
how to perform complex queries and function (the ultimate pur-
pose of information sharing) on such split architecture, also in a
privacy preserving manner.
4. QUALITY OF SHARING
So far we have focused on the issue of privacy associated with the
sharing, as well as the threat of sharing due to poorly understood
communities of trust, which deserve further considerations. An-
other important research issue in the context of information shar-
ing for actionable intelligence is the quality of shared information.
Without high quality of shared information, no actionable intelli-
gence can be obtained. Unfortunately, this issue is not well under-
stood in the literature, and requires further exploration by identify-
ing meaning of quality, and basic methods and tools for assessing
it.
We believe that the quality of indicators is of paramount impor-
tance to the end-goal of information sharing: a timely indicator,
like a source of attack, could be used to defend against an emerg-
ing attack, unlike a stale indicators that could be hardly used for
postmortem analysis. Thus quality of indicators is a central issue
in information sharing, and requires further attention for realizing
the proper definitions, tools for quantification, and incentives for
improvement. Little work, however, has been done in the literature
on understanding this central notion.
In section 2.5, we hinted on the potential correlation between
the quality of indicators and privacy. However, privacy is not the
only factor that affects the quality of indicators (albeit perhaps neg-
atively, when privacy of indicator is ensured). Indicators are often
time-sensitive, and time is another way to assess the quality of in-
dicator. Finally, a meaningful annotation and label of the indicator
is another potential assessor of the quality of the indicator.
How to assess the value and quality of an indicator is a nontrivial
task: if a consumer in the information sharing community knew
the information provided to him through the sharing community,
he would not need the sharing of the data in the first place.
One way to deal with the quality of indicators is to use historical
information provided by various community members as a metric
for their quality. A community member that provided information
that turned to be useful and timely in the past could be annotated
as a quality indicators provider, and vice versa. However, such ap-
proach for determine the quality of indicators would fall short in
multiple aspects. First, it assesses providers of indicators, rather
than individual indicators. Second, certain community members
might be well known for certain indicators, e.g., domain names,
and other indicators, e.g., binaries, and taking the average of both
indicators contributed by them might penalize them, thus not al-
lowing community members to benefit from the (partially) valu-
able indicators they provide. A possible technique to overcome
this shortcoming is to assess community members on various types
of indicators, rather than giving them a single score.
However, even with such consideration, scoring is still for a
coarse grained feature of the community member. A scoring that
considers history of the community member as a whole, or per class
of indicators, and does not assign meaningful scores to individual
indicators, is less meaningful. Individual indicators could be more
important than the reputation or general quality of the community
member, as they are ultimately consumed by the various commu-
nity members, and their quality indicates the effectiveness of infor-
mation sharing.
Recent advances in machine learning and applications to security
could be a fruitful direction to answer this question [15, 40, 27, 28,
29, 26] in two ways. First, individual indicators, like a label of mal-
ware sample, could be easily vetted through other streams of labels
by other vendors [28]. Second, labels of indicators, even that are
not known to a consumer, could be regenerated by extrapolation,
and using machine learning techniques and underlying features of
the indicator if the consumer of the indicator had prior samples with
the same (or similar label) [27]. Exploring how machine learning
could be used to assess the quality of indicators is still an open
direction that calls for further investigation.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides a roadmap of issues that need to be ex-
plored in order to realize efficient and effective information shar-
ing paradigms for actionable intelligence. With the evolution of
the threat and security landscape, no single defender will be able to
defend against all threats alone, calling for the utilization of shar-
ing paradigms. However, in order to utilize such paradigms a finer
understanding of the various issues associated with sharing is re-
quired, including, but not limited to, the underlying community of
trust, threat and use models, and privacy highlighted through mea-
surable contexts from various sharing standards and datasets. We
argue that utilizing the differential nature of data and communi-
ties of trust could be nicely utilized as a feature for optimizing the
overhead of sharing, the role that machine learning could play in
understanding and assessing the quality of indicators.
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